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MOTIVATION
Recently, social experiments have gained
popularity as a method for evaluating social and labor
market programs. 1 High-profile evaluations such as the
National JTPA Study in the United States and the SelfSufficiency Project in Canada have brought about real
changes in the views and the actions of policymakers.
Most of the literature relates to these two countries in
which there is a long-standing tradition of evaluat~g
labor market programs. In this study, we also use data
collected from an experiment in the United States.
Indeed, in the United States, there is a requirement for
public authorities to evaluate their programs. Few
European countries have carried out rigorous
evaluations; the Netherlands are not an exception.
There, the most common method of "evaluation"
consists of simply monitoring the labor market status
and earnings of recipients for a brief period following
their participation in the program. Although this kind
of exercise provides useful information, it cannot
answer the vital question as to whether the program
fulfills its aim.
Ideally, the evaluator would like to know what the
outcome would have been for a program participant if
the person had not participated; the fundamental
difficulty is that a person is never observed in both
states. The observable target of estimation is typically
the average effect, defined as the average difference
between treated (in the program) and untreated
outcomes across all persons in a popUlation or in some
subpopulation. In a non-experimental evaluation,
statistical techniques are used to adjust the outcomes of
individuals who choose not to participate in the
program to resemble what the participants would have
experienced had they not participated. By contrast, a
random experiment directly produces the counterfactual
of what would have happened to the participant had
they not participated by forcing some potential
participants not to participate.
In theory, data from a randomized experiment
produce an unbiased estimate of the effect of an
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intervention or program on an outcome variable. A
simple comparison of the average outcomes of the
treatment group (consisting of those who participate in
the program) and the control group (those who are
excluded from participation) produces a consistent
estimate of the impact of the program on its
participants. In practice, a randomized experiment
may suffer from the same problems that affect
behavioral studies. In particular, the random
assignment of the intervention is often compromised
by noncompliance with the assigned intervention, i.e.,
members of the treatment sample may drop out of the
program and members of the control group may
participate. Noncompliance complicates the analysis
of data from a randomized experiment in the same way
as does nonresponse in (random) sample surveys and
panel attrition in longitudinal studies. If the
noncompliance is selective (i.e., is correlated with the
outcome variable), then the difference of the average
outcomes is a biased estimate of the average effect of
the intervention.
Sample selectivity is a familiar problem for
economists, and over the years a number of approaches
have been suggested to reduce selectivity bias. Since
Heckman's work, the dominant approach has been to
model the selection process. 2 This is the natural
approach if the selection process is of independent
interest and the econometrician understands the
process well enough to propose a reasonably accurate
model. The first generation of these models required
an assumption about the joint distribution of the
responsevaIiable and the (latent) variable that
determined participation in the program. In the second
generation, this assumption is replaced by an elaborate
model of the selection process under the assumption
that an unbiased estimate of the intervention effect is
obtained by comparing units with an (approximately)
equal probability of participation.
Often-and the application considered in this
thesis is a good example-there is not enough
information to specify a model of the selection process.
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Moreover, the available characteristics of the
individuals, although significantly correlated with
compliance, do not explain compliance well enough to
enable a comparison between members of the treatment
and control groups in a subsample with the same
probability of compliance. Under these circumstances
an approach that does not require a model of the
selection process is preferable.
The method of instrumental variables (IV) gives an
unbiased estimate of the intervention effect and does
not require a model of participation. This method
assumes that the treatment assignment results from a
two-stage process, where in the first stage the sample is
divided randomly in two (or more) groups, and in the
second stage, units are free to decide whether to
participate in the program or not. In the clinical
literature, this experimental design is called the
intention-to-treat (ITT) design.
Most of the evaluation literature has focused on
static interventions, i.e., interventions that are
administered at a particular point in time or in a
particular time interval. If the outcome is a waiting
time (e.g., the time until reemployment), the
intervention can be dynamic; that is, it can be switched
on and off over time. Examples are the unemployment
insurance experiments in which the unemployed
receive a cash bonus if they find a job in a specified
period. Another example is a temporary cut in
unemployment benefits of unemployed individuals who
do not expend sufficient effort to find a job. In general,
the intervention may even depend on information that
accumulates during the unemployment spell. With
such a time-varying intervention, the effect of the
intervention becomes dependent on the outcome.
A basic quantity, fundamental in duration analysis,
is the hazard rate. The hazard rate is, roughly speaking,
the probability of finding a job after some time spent in
unemployment, given that the individual was still
unemployed at that time. It has a direct relation to the
density of a random variable. Economic models for
durations, e.g., search models, often have direct
implications for the hazard rate. One advantage of a
hazard rate model is that incorporating time-varying
interventions is fairly easy and natural.
Another reason to consider the effect of an
intervention on the hazard rate is that duration data are
usually censored. Censoring limits the observation
period but is not a feature of the program. Hence, the
estimated effect should be independent of the censoring
time. Because the hazard rate is invariant to censoring,
it is natural to relate the intervention to this quantity.
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Two competing approaches to the estimation of the
effect of a time-varying treatment on survival have been
the (Mixed) Proportional Hazard ([M]PH) model and
the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. The MPH
models have developed popularity among
econometricians, and the AFT is commonly used by
biostatisticians and medical statisticians. In the MPH
model, the hazard is written as the product of the
baseline hazard, a non-negative regression function,
and a non-negative random variable that represents the
covariates that are omitted from the regression
function. There is a direct relation between hazard
models (in particular the PH and MPH models) and
transformation models (i.e., regression models in which
the dependent variable is transformed). The simplest
transformation model is the AFT model in which the
dependent variable is the logarithm of the duration.
If all the covariates in the model are exogenous,
many possible procedures to estimate the parameters of
the AFT or MPH models exist. However, if some of the
covariates are endogenous, all these methods fail and it
is not straightforward how to generalize the standard IV
methods to these nonlinear duration models. This
thesis is one of the first attempts to provide
instrumental methods for these models with possible
endogenous covariates. It also gives a new solution to
well-known inference problems of the MPH models.
The estimation methods are all based on extensions of
the (inverse of the) log-rank statistic.

In Chapter 2, we introduce a two-stage IV method
for the MPH models to estimate the effect of a possible
endogenous intervention on the hazard. This rank
estimation method requires that the members of the
control group are excluded from participation. The
unobserved heterogeneity component of the MPH
models is notoriously hard to estimate and empirically
difficult to distinguish from the duration dependence,
which can lead to misleading conclusions with regard
to the regression parameters. In Chapter 3, we
introduce the Generalized Accelerated Failure Time
(GAFT) model, which is a generalization of both the
AFT and the MPH models. We discuss a semiparametric estimation procedure of the parameters of
this model that is independent of the shape of the
unobserved heterogeneity. In Chapter 3 we only
consider exogenous interventions. The analysis of
endogenous interventions in the GAFT is dealt with in
Chapter 4. In that chapter, we develop an IV method
for the GAFT models. First, I give a short overview of
the data used in the applications.
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REEMPLOYMENT BONUS DATA AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
Throughout this thesis, we illustrate the use of our
proposed models and estimators by applying them to
data from reemployment experiments conducted
between mid 1984 and mid 1985 by the Illinois
Department of Employment Security.3 The experiment
provides the opportunity to explore, within a controlled
experimental setting, whether bonuses paid to
unemployment insurance (UI) beneficiaries (treatment
1) or their employers (treatment 2) reduce the
unemployment of beneficiaries relative to a randomly
selected control group. The first treatment was
intended to create an incentive for UI recipients to
search more intensively for work and to become
employed faster. The second treatment was designed to
provide a marginal wage subsidy that might reduce the
duration of insured unemployment.
Both treatments consisted of a $500 bonus
payment, which was about four times the average
weekly unemployment insurance benefit. In the
experiment, newly unemployed claimants were
randomly divided into three groups.4
• The members of the claimant bonus group were
instructed that they would qualify for a cash
bonus of $500 if they found a job (of at least 30
hours) within 11 weeks and if they held that job
for at least four months. A total of 4,186 individuals were selected for this group. Of those, 3,527
(84 percent) agreed to participate.
• The employer bonus group was told that their
next employer would qualify for a cash bonus of
$500 if they, the claimants, found a job (of at
least 30 hours) within 11 weeks and if they held
that job for at least four months. Of the 3,963
selected for this group, 2,586 (65 percent) agreed
to participate.
• The control group (i.e., all claimants not assigned
to one of the other groups) consisted of 3,952
individuals.
The individuals assigned to the control group were
excluded from participation in the experiment. In fact,
they did not know that the experiment took place. The
results of the experiment indicated a reduction in the
mean number of weeks of insured unemployment. The
average number of insured weeks of unemployment
decreased about one and one-half weeks for all VI
recipients assigned to the claimant bonus group and
about half a week for those assigned to the employer
bonus group (both relative to the control group).
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However, because the VI recipients are only observed
while they receive VI benefits, for many (about 60
percent) unemployed we only know the time they spend
on benefits and not the time until reemployment. Thus,
the data is heavily censored at the maximum number of
potential weeks of VI insurance, which is 26 weeks for
all the individuals in the experiment.
If the bonus reduces the time spent in
unemployment, it also reduces the probability that VI
recipients will exhaust their VI benefits. Therefore,
with censored data, taking averages can lead to wrong
conclusions about the effect of the bonus on the
duration of unemployment. In this thesis, we show that
the logical means of accounting for this censoring
problem is to relate the effect of the bonus to the hazard
rate instead of to the average duration.

Another reason to consider the hazard rate is that
the treatment itself varies over time. Because the
period of bonus eligibility ends after 11 weeks, we
expect that the effect of the bonus on the reemployment
hazard disappears after that time. It is difficult to take
such time-varying interventions-which are common
in duration data-into account when taking averages.
For all three groups the reemployment hazard is high at
the start of the unemployment spell, decreases to a
minimum after 16 to 20 weeks in unemployment, and
rises again close to the benefit exhaustion time of 26
weeks. The hazards for both treatment groups are
higher then the hazards for the control group.
However, we cannot draw strong conclusions from
these hazard rates due to potential selection bias.
About 15 percent of the claimant bonus group and 35
percent of the employer bonus group refused
participation. The reason for this refusal is not known,
and it is hard to think of an economic model for this
decision. The refusal was not completely random,
because it was significantly related to some
characteristics of the participants, characteristics that
are also important determinants of the reemployment
hazard. Hence, we can not exclude the possibility that
some unobserved variables affect both the compliance
decision and the reemployment hazard.
The existence of heterogeneity will bias the
aggregate treatment effect measure. If the specification
of the hazard rate model is incomplete, then
randomization at the start of the spell does not ensure
an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect, if the
intervention affects the hazard rate multiplicatively. To
understand this, presuppose the existence of two types
of unemployed where one type has higher hazard rates
than the other. The unemployed with a large hazard

17

rate leave the unemployed state quickly, and those with
a small hazard rate typically have long unemployment
spells. In the absence of the experiment, the sample of
VI recipients still unemployed over time will have an
increasing fraction of low-hazard-rate individuals.
Therefore, the aggregate hazard would slope downward
as more weight is placed on the low-hazard group. If
the bonus leads to a proportional increase in the hazards
of both types, the high-hazard types in the treatment
group leave even faster than the high-hazard types in
the control group, and this induces a correlation
between the type and the intervention indicator. It is
not difficult to see that the resulting bias in the
intervention effect is toward zero. Note that there is no
bias if the intervention has an additive effect on the
hazard rate.
Thus, we need an estimator of the effect of the
bonus on the reemployment hazard that is consistent if
there is selective compliance to the assigned bonus
regime, if the data is heavily censored and, finally, if the
treatment varies over the duration of the unemployment
spell. Chapters 2 and 4 address the estimation of the
effect of the bonus for two related models. We propose
two instrumental variable methods for duration models
that adjust for the potential endogeneity of the choice to
be eligible for the bonus. The first method explicitly
uses the full compliance of the control group, while the
second method allows for the possibility that some
members of the control group are also eligible for the
bonus. Chapter 3 only considers the data on the control
group and discusses the issues concerning rank
estimation of a model that generalizes two commonly
applied duration models, without worrying about the
endogeneity of any covariates in the model. In Chapter
4, we return to the whole dataset and extend the model
of the preceding chapter to allow for selective
compliance.
We do not attempt to estimate the effect of bonuseligible individuals collecting the bonus or not. Before
a bonus could be paid in this experiment, each member
of the claimant and employer group had to make a
number of decisions. Firstly, whether to agree to
participate. Secondly, if a job was found within 11
weeks, whether to file the Notice of Hire. Finally,
whether to file for a bonus if the job lasted at least four
months. This thesis only examines the effect of the
bonus on the first unemployment spell, corrected for
bias due to nonparticipation.

earnings data from the Illinois experiment seem heavily
blurred. For many reemployed individuals, the
(quarterly) wage in their new job is unknown 01' too low
to be true. Therefore, we focus on the effect of the
bonus on the duration of insured unemployment using a
reduced form model that does not incorporate the
reemployment earnings data. We do, on the other hand,
use the information on the pre-unemployment earnings.
An important limitation of the data is that we
cannot ascertain the true labor status of a claimant
when the VI benefits are exhausted. The administrative
data are blind to the labor status of an individual unless
he or she is employed in a UI-covered job or
unemployed and receiving UI benefits. A significant
fraction of individuals do not have reported positive
post-UI benefit earnings. This is likely due to the same
blindness ofthe data. In contradiction to job search
theory, none of the earnings measures indicate a
significant deviation of the earnings due to the bonus
experiment.

If the bonus and the rules for collecting it would
become widely known, both the worker and firm
behavior may change in several dimensions. For
example, many people who have a short spell of
unemployment between jobs presently do not collect
any UI benefits. The bonus could induce some of these
individuals to apply for and receive some VI in order to
collect the bonus. This is a classic example of a
deadweight effect, in which individuals receive a bonus
for behavior they would have displayed anyway. This
general equilibrium effect would reduce the effect in
the society of the bonus program relative to that
estimated by the experiment (see Meyer 1995 for a
discussion).
General equilibrium effects occur when the
program affects individuals other than its participants.
Other commonly mentioned general equilibrium effects
are displacement effects (for example, if persons in the
program take the job that otherwise would have been
taken by other unemployed individuals); substitution
effects (if the program induces the employers to
substitute one group of workers for another group); and
tax effects (whereby the taxes collected to finance the
program distort the choices of both participants and
nonparticipants). In the context of this thesis, we do
not attempt to take these possible side effects into
account and therefore we ignore their impact in the
analyses.

Neither do we use the data on reemployment
(quarterly) earnings. In principle, the wage data could
be used to estimate a structural job search (see, e.g.,
Levine 1992; Davidson and Woodbury 1996). The
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THESIS OUTLINE
In Chapter 2, we propose an estimator that is
consistent for the intervention effect if there is selective
compliance to the intervention, the outcome variable is
a censored duration, and the intervention varies over the
duration. The duration model is the popular mixed
proportional hazard (MPH) model, although we need
not impose the restriction on the disturbance
distribution that is implicit in the MPH model. The
estimator is a generalization of the linear rank estimator
ofTsiatis (1990) and Robins and Tsiatis (1991).
In particular, we allow for a nonconstant baseline
hazard, which amounts to a transformation of the
dependent duration in the regression representation of
the MPH model. The estimator requires preliminary
estimates of the baseline hazard. If there is compliance
in the control group, then these preliminary estimates
can be obtained from the control group sample. This is
often the case in social experiments where the number
of participants is a small fraction of the population and
the members of the control group are not informed of
the existence of the experimental program or can easily
be excluded from participation. The preliminary
estimates are substituted in the second-stage estimating
equation of the intervention effect. This two-stage
linear rank estimator is computationally attractive,
because it avoids the choice of weighting functions for
the estimation of the parameters of the baseline hazard.
If the control group sample is also used in the second
stage, the additional variability due to the preliminary
estimates and the induced conelation between the
preliminary estimates and the second-stage estimating
equation complicates the computation of the
asymptotic variance. Using the counting process
representation of the first-stage score, we can obtain an
estimable expression of this rather complicated
variance.
The estimator is applied on the data from the
Illinois unemployment bonus experiment. Our
estimates show that compliance in the Illinois bonus
experiment was indeed selective. We also investigate
whether evidence of effect heterogeneity by income
before unemployment and by the probability of benefit
exhaustion is biased by selective compliance.
In Chapter 3, we consider a generalization of the
accelerated failure time (AFT) models that includes the
MPH models: that is, the generalized accelerated
failure time (GAFT) model. In the GAFT model, the
dependent variable, the time-to-event, is transformed,
and this unknown transformation has to be estimated
together with the regression parameters in the

2001 Dissertation Summaries

regression function and the enor distribution. A major
advantage of the GAFT model over the MPH model is
that the unknown components of the GAFT model (i.e.,
the parameters of the regression function, the
transformation, and the enor distribution) are all
estimable with the usual precision. The only
disadvantage of the GAFT specification is that the
estimated parameters cannot directly be related to the
hazard of the time-to-event. We provide an alternative
interpretation by relating the components of the GAFT
model to the quantiles of the duration distribution.
We generalize the linear rank estimators that have
been used to estimate the parameters of the AFT
models to the GAFT models. The asymptotic
properties of this linear rank estimator (LRE) are
derived using counting process theory. We also address
the semiparametric efficiency of this estimator.
Simulation experiments indicate that the LRE performs
well in samples of moderate size. An important side
effect of the proposed methods in this chapter is that
they provide a new solution to the notorious inference
problems of the MPH models. Our semiparametric
method leaves the distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity unspecified and gives consistent
estimates of the other parameters.
The methods in Chapter 3 are only applicable for
exogenous covariates, and therefore we exclusively
focus on the control group in the Illinois reemployment
experiment. This group consisted of individuals who
were excluded from participation in the experiment. In
fact, we are sure they did not know that the experiment
took place. We estimate GAFT models for this data
using linear rank estimators. Both the simulation
experiments and the application show that inconectly
assuming an AFT model can lead to misleading
conclusions about the regression coefficients.
The GAFT model can be applied to estimate the
effect of a randomly assigned (time-varying) treatment
on survival. Using the actual treatment as a normal
covariate in the model will give biased results of the
treatment effect if some of the individuals do not
comply with their assigned treatment. The problem is
that even if the intervention has no effect on the hazard,
the treatment parameter may not have a causal
interpretation, because those who comply with their
assigned treatment differ in observed and unobserved
characteristics from those who do not comply. One
could ignore the postrandomization compliance and
rely on the analysis of the treatment assignment groups.
This intention-to-treat estimator suffers from an enorin-variable bias.
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In Chapter 4, we propose an instrumental variable
method for GAFT models that adjusts for the possible
endogeneity of the intervention without suffering the
problems of the intention-to-treat method. We develop
an estimation procedure that collapses to the linear rank
estimator procedure for GAFT models without
instrumenting. The GAFT models with instrumenting
are a generalization of the rank-preserving structural
failure time (RPSFT) models of Robins and Tsiatis
(1991). Both models consider a transformation of the
duration time to identify the treatment parameters, but
the GAFT models allow for an extension of the
transformation. The main drawback of the RPSFT
models is that they assume a latent baseline duration
time exists, representing the individual's survival time
had the intervention always been withheld. This
implies that if two individuals have identical durations
and observed treatment and covariate histories, then
they would have had identical durations had they never
been treated. The GAFT models are not rankpreserving and therefore do not imply this strong
noninteraction.
The two-stage linear rank (2SLR) estimator of
Chapter 2 is related to the instrumental variable linear
rank (IVLR) estimator proposed in Chapter 4. The
2SLR restricts the transformation to an MPH
representation and requires preliminary estimates of the
baseline hazard. The 2SLR is only applicable if there is
full compliance in the control group, because only then
are the preliminary estimates identified. The analysis in
Chapter 4 does not impose the MPH assumption, nor
does it require that the control group is totally excluded
from treatment.
The existence of endogenous covariates implies
(possible) dependence between the transformed
duration and the censoring time. This implies that the
IVLR estimator, which exploits the independence
between the transformed durations and the instruments,
may give biased results. If the censoring is part of the
study design or a consequence of administrative rules,
we can often make the assumption that the (potential)
censoring time is known at the start of the study. Then
we can modify the GAFT transformation such that this
modified transformation and the instruments are
independent, and the IVLR estimator on this modified
transformation leads to consistent estimators.
Again the data from the Illinois unemployment
bonus experiment is used. In Chapter 4, we focus on
the importance of extending the RPSFT models to the
GAFT models for the reemployment data. Indeed, we
find evidence that the RPSFT model is not the correct
model for this application. Our results show that

20

restriction the transformation to an AFT model leads to
an overestimation of the effect of the bonus.
The Coase Theorem predicts that in a world of zero
transaction costs, the bonuses paid to the claimant
group and to the employer group would be equally
efficient. Because they both imply the same amount of
money, an employment contract would be established
whenever the bonus was sufficient to enable a mutually
advantageous bargain to be struck. Woodbury and
Spiegelman (1987) concluded that only the claimant
bonus significantly reduces unemployment. We cannot
confirm the different treatment effects of the two
bonuses. The selective decision to be eligible for the
employer bonus seems to blur the effect of this
treatment. Our results also indicate that the bonuses
only influence the probability to find a job in the first 10
weeks, which is in line with the bonus eligibility
period.
NOTES
This thesis consists of three separate articles. Each chapter is
solely based on those articles. Every chapter can be read
independently of the other chapters; this implies that there is
some overlap between the chapters. Moreover, the
introductory sections, the sections on the application on the
Illinois data, and the appendices with asymptotic properties
exhibit substantial repetition among the chapters. The
common basis of the chapters is rank estimation in duration
models.
This summary is from the author's doctoral dissertation at
Free University of Amsterdam; his advisor was G. Ridder.
Dr. Bijwaard is now at Erasmus University, Rotterdam.

1. The chapters by Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999)
and Angrist and Krueger (1999) in the most recent
Handbook of Labor Economics discuss the tremendous
flow of ideas on how to undertake evaluations of active
labor market policies.
2. James Heckman won the 2000 Nobel Price for economics
for his contributions to micro econometric theory on
selection bias and evaluation of active labor market
programs.
3. A complete description of the experiment and a summary
of its results can be found in Woodbury and Spiegelman
(1987).
4. The eligible population for either the claimant experiment
or the employer experiment consisted of those who filed
an initial claim for Ul between July 29, 1984, and
November 17, 1984, and who registered with one of the 22
job service offices in northern and central Illinois.
Individuals had to be eligible for 26 weeks of UI benefits,
had to be between ages 20 and 55, and had to have no
nonmonetary eligible claims.
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